Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
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Publication:5129207
DOI10.1287/opre.2019.1909zbMath1444.90074OpenAlexW2971924490WikidataQ127310479 ScholiaQ127310479MaRDI QIDQ5129207
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Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1909
Related Items (6)
Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Fisher markets with linear constraints: equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions ⋮ Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
Cites Work
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- A Matroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- The Core of an N Person Game
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