Stable matching with proportionality constraints
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Publication:5129207
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2019.1909zbMATH Open1444.90074OpenAlexW2971924490WikidataQ127310479 ScholiaQ127310479MaRDI QIDQ5129207FDOQ5129207
Authors:
Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1909
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Cites Work
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- The Core of an N Person Game
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
Cited In (15)
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Fair matching under constraints: theory and applications
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Procedurally fair and stable matching
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Fisher markets with linear constraints: equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms
- Constrained random matching
- Sustainable matching plans with adverse selection
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
- Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
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