Procedurally fair and stable matching
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Publication:2580967
DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0602-5zbMath1102.91077OpenAlexW2105688526MaRDI QIDQ2580967
Publication date: 10 January 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0602-5
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