On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One
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Publication:2832573
DOI10.1137/140996690zbMath1353.68211OpenAlexW2548768546MaRDI QIDQ2832573
Publication date: 11 November 2016
Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/140996690
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items
Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences, Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints, Stable secretaries
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