scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960
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Publication:4130997
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Local search approaches in stable matching problems
- On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- On lattice and DA
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why.
- Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
- The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
- Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Matching with ownership
- A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
- How do I marry thee? Let me count the ways
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- Stability and stabilisation of networked pairing problem via event-triggered control
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
- A unifying approach to the structures of the stable matching problems
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Geometric stable roommates
- Pareto optimality in coalition formation
- Paths to marriage stability
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
- Courtship and linear programming
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Sex-equal stable matchings: complexity and exact algorithms
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- My encounters with David Gale
- Eccentricity, center and radius computations on the cover graphs of distributive lattices with applications to stable matchings
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
- On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Bayesian stable states
- One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- ReGale: some memorable results
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
- Antimatroids induced by matchings
- A bounded approximation for the minimum cost 2-sat problem
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
- A generalization of the stable matching problem
- Transformation from arbitrary matchings to stable matchings
- On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
- On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- ``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Characterization of cores of assignment games
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
- The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
- A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
- Paths to stable allocations
- Stable matchings and linear programming
- The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- A fast algorithm for the generalized parametric minimum cut problem and applications
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- Matching games with partial information
- Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
- College admissions with stable score-limits
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