scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960
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Publication:4130997
zbMath0358.68057MaRDI QIDQ4130997
Publication date: 1976
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Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to computer science (68-01) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Algorithms in computer science (68W99)
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