Mariages stables et leurs relations avec d'autres problèmes combinatoires. Introduction à l'analyse mathématique des algorithmes
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- A fast algorithm for the generalized parametric minimum cut problem and applications
- The complexity of circuit value and network stability
- A bounded approximation for the minimum cost 2-sat problem
- A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
- DNA models and algorithms for NP-complete problems
- Stable matchings and linear inequalities
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why.
- A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
- Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts
- Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Antimatroids induced by matchings
- Local search approaches in stable matching problems
- Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Transformation from arbitrary matchings to stable matchings
- A generalization of the stable matching problem
- Courtship and linear programming
- The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Matching games with partial information
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- How do I marry thee? Let me count the ways
- Paths to marriage stability
- Stable matchings with couples
- Stable matchings and linear programming
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Matching with ownership
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Paths to stable allocations
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
- The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
- ReGale: some memorable results
- My encounters with David Gale
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
- Pareto optimality in coalition formation
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Eccentricity, center and radius computations on the cover graphs of distributive lattices with applications to stable matchings
- On (coalitional) exchange-stable matching
- Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
- Disjoint stable matchings in linear time
- On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- ``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
- Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
- On lattice and DA
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
- How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Stability and stabilisation of networked pairing problem via event-triggered control
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
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