scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960

zbMATH Open0358.68057MaRDI QIDQ4130997FDOQ4130997

Publication date: 1976

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to computer science (68-01) Algorithms in computer science (68W99)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
My encounters with David Gale
Eccentricity, center and radius computations on the cover graphs of distributive lattices with applications to stable matchings
Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
Optimal truncation in matching markets
Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
``Timing is everything and marital bliss
A bounded approximation for the minimum cost 2-sat problem
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
A generalization of the stable matching problem
Transformation from arbitrary matchings to stable matchings
On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
The myopic stable set for social environments
Characterization of cores of assignment games
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
Matching with myopic and farsighted players
Student admissions and faculty recruitment
Median stable matching for markets with wages
Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
A fast algorithm for the generalized parametric minimum cut problem and applications
Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
College admissions with stable score-limits
\(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
Stable matchings with couples
Stable matchings and linear inequalities
Parametric stable marriage and minimum cuts
Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
The evolution of social and economic networks.
Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
DNA models and algorithms for NP-complete problems
Paths to stability in the assignment problem
A dynamic model of the marriage market. I: Matching algorithm based on age preference and availability
Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
The complexity of circuit value and network stability
Stable matchings and preferences of couples
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
Local search approaches in stable matching problems
On lattice and DA
Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings
Linear programming brings marital bliss
A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why.
Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem
Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
Analysis of stochastic matching markets
Pareto optimality in coalition formation
A unifying approach to the structures of the stable matching problems
Geometric stable roommates
Paths to marriage stability
Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
Sex-equal stable matchings: complexity and exact algorithms
Entering classes in the college admissions model
The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
Minimal envy and popular matchings
Bribery and control in stable marriage
Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
Bayesian stable states
Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings
One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
ReGale: some memorable results
How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
Antimatroids induced by matchings
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
The lattice of envy-free matchings
Paths to stable allocations

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