scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960
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Publication:4130997
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- My encounters with David Gale
- Eccentricity, center and radius computations on the cover graphs of distributive lattices with applications to stable matchings
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
- On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Bayesian stable states
- One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- ReGale: some memorable results
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
- Antimatroids induced by matchings
- A bounded approximation for the minimum cost 2-sat problem
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
- A generalization of the stable matching problem
- Transformation from arbitrary matchings to stable matchings
- On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
- On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- ``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Characterization of cores of assignment games
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
- The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
- A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
- Paths to stable allocations
- Stable matchings and linear programming
- The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- A fast algorithm for the generalized parametric minimum cut problem and applications
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- Matching games with partial information
- Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
- d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
- Stable matchings with couples
- Stable matchings and linear inequalities
- Preface to the special issue on ``Group formation and farsightedness
- Parametric stable marriage and minimum cuts
- Gale-Shapley verified
- Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts
- Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- DNA models and algorithms for NP-complete problems
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- A dynamic model of the marriage market. I: Matching algorithm based on age preference and availability
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- The complexity of circuit value and network stability
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Disjoint stable matchings in linear time
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy
- Sweeping up zeta
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Adapting stable matchings to forced and forbidden pairs
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
- On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems
- Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
- On (coalitional) exchange-stable matching
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
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