``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
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Publication:428844
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2012.01.022zbMath1242.68111MaRDI QIDQ428844
David F. Manlove, Péter Biró, Eric J. McDermid
Publication date: 25 June 2012
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.01.022
approximation algorithm; polynomial-time algorithm; stable roommates problem; APX-hardness; blocking pairs
05C70: Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.)
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
05C85: Graph algorithms (graph-theoretic aspects)
68W25: Approximation algorithms
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