Median stable matching for markets with wages
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2167003 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Introduction to Topological Manifolds
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
- Median stable matching for college admissions
- On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
Cited in
(11)- Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5964913 (Why is no real title available?)
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Improving the Chilean college admissions system
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
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