Median stable matching for markets with wages
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Publication:533097
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.12.004zbMATH Open1282.91234OpenAlexW3125015338MaRDI QIDQ533097FDOQ533097
Michael Schwarz, M. Bumin Yenmez
Publication date: 2 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.004
Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Improving the Chilean College Admissions System
- The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
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