Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
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Publication:1735744
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015zbMath1419.91539OpenAlexW2894935954WikidataQ129141575 ScholiaQ129141575MaRDI QIDQ1735744
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015
Related Items (4)
On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ Parallel markets in school choice ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
Cites Work
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- School Choice with Consent*
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
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