Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
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Publication:5964686
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004zbMath1347.91206OpenAlexW3125859299MaRDI QIDQ5964686
Vikram Manjunath, Bertan Turhan
Publication date: 1 March 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004
Related Items
Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment, On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets, Parallel markets in school choice, When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?, Stability in matching markets with peer effects, Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets, Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago, Social integration in two-sided matching markets, Gradual college admission, Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
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