Gradual college admission
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2067380
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105378zbMath1481.91125OpenAlexW2991632649MaRDI QIDQ2067380
Guillaume Haeringer, Vincent Iehlé
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02330435v2/file/gca-march21.pdf
Related Items
Parallel markets in school choice, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Dynamically stable matching, When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?, Online 2-stage stable matching, Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
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