An analysis of the German university admissions system
From MaRDI portal
Publication:361830
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4zbMath1278.91108MaRDI QIDQ361830
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74644
strategyproofness; complex constraints; German admissions system; matching, stability; university admissions
Related Items
Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints, Dynamically stable matching, Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves, Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas, Fair implementation of diversity in school choice, College admissions with stable score-limits, Responsive affirmative action in school choice, An analysis of the German university admissions system, School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds, Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints, Dynamic reserves in matching markets, Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment, Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution, Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas, A college admissions clearinghouse, On lexicographic choice, Graduate admission with financial support, How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field, Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers, Gradual college admission, Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity, College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion, Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment, On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information, Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem, Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy, On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice, Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications, Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments, Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study, Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers, Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- School choice: an experimental study
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
