Nash implementation of matching rules
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Publication:1920914
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0024zbMATH Open0854.90002OpenAlexW2082193480MaRDI QIDQ1920914FDOQ1920914
Publication date: 6 August 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/097f4f52ce9cd27c3d6b14d23a23c33a749f2a74
Cited In (36)
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Arbitrated matching: Formulation and protocol
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- An impossibility theorem for matching problems
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
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