Nash implementation of matching rules
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Publication:1920914
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0024zbMath0854.90002MaRDI QIDQ1920914
Publication date: 6 August 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/097f4f52ce9cd27c3d6b14d23a23c33a749f2a74
91B08: Individual preferences
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