Nash implementation of matching rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1920914
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0024zbMath0854.90002OpenAlexW2082193480MaRDI QIDQ1920914
Publication date: 6 August 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/097f4f52ce9cd27c3d6b14d23a23c33a749f2a74
Related Items
Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Nash implementation of the majority rule ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ Maskin's theorem with limited veto power ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems ⋮ Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities ⋮ On the existence of stable roommate matchings ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
