Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0058-YMaRDI QIDQ2500719zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Orhan Erdem, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0058-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Consistency of decision processes
• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Geometry of voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Stable voting schemes
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result

Cited in

(10)

• Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
• Nash implementation of the majority rule
• Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
• On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
• Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
• Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
• Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
• Nash implementable domains for the Borda count

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