Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
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Publication:2500719
DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0058-yzbMath1132.91411MaRDI QIDQ2500719
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0058-y
91B14: Social choice
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