Implementability via protective equilibria

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2MaRDI QIDQ800203zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhaskar Dutta, Salvador Barberà

Publication date 1982

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2

zbMATH Keywords

games generated by social choice functionsnoncooperative strategic equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
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Cites work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Stability in Voting
• Stable voting schemes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power

Cited in

(22)

• Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good
• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
• Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
• The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
• Protective and prudent behaviour in games
• Protective behavior in matching models
• Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• Salvador Barberà
• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
• Level-k mechanism design
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number
• Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion
• On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
• A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
• Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange

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