Implementability via protective equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Stability in Voting
- Stable voting schemes
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
Cited in
(22)- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Protective behavior in matching models
- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion
- Salvador Barberà
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
- Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
- General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
- Level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Protective and prudent behaviour in games
This page was built for publication: Implementability via protective equilibria
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q800203)