On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
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Publication:4153862
DOI10.2307/1913653zbMath0376.90012OpenAlexW2055027894MaRDI QIDQ4153862
Bhaskar Dutta, Prasanta K. Pattanaik
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913653
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