The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(81)90002-1zbMATH Open0461.90004OpenAlexW2069453766WikidataQ126850636 ScholiaQ126850636MaRDI QIDQ1152837FDOQ1152837

Authors: Ishai Oren 

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(81)90002-1

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityexistenceuniquenessminimal blocking coalitionanonymous exactly strongly consistent social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

Cited In (9)

• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• The capacity of a committee
• Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions

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