Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
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Publication:2357822
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.008zbMath1393.91059OpenAlexW1607337034MaRDI QIDQ2357822
Bezalel Peleg, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 20 June 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.008
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