A characterization of proportionally representative committees

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.006zbMath1490.91094arXiv2002.09598OpenAlexW3007075966MaRDI QIDQ2673225

Barton E. Lee, Haris Aziz

Publication date: 9 June 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09598

zbMATH Keywords

proportional representationcommittee selectionsingle transferable votemulti-winner voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• An interview with Michael Dummett: From analytical philosophy to voting analysis and beyond
• On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote
• Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
• Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
• Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
• The Core of an N Person Game

This page was built for publication: A characterization of proportionally representative committees