The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
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Publication:2179446
Abstract: Proportional representation (PR) is often discussed in voting settings as a major desideratum. For the past century or so, it is common both in practice and in the academic literature to jump to single transferable vote (STV) as the solution for achieving PR. Some of the most prominent electoral reform movements around the globe are pushing for the adoption of STV. It has been termed a major open problem to design a voting rule that satisfies the same PR properties as STV and better monotonicity properties. In this paper, we first present a taxonomy of proportional representation axioms for general weak order preferences, some of which generalise and strengthen previously introduced concepts. We then present a rule called Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) that satisfies properties stronger than the central PR axiom satisfied by STV, can handle indifferences in a convenient and computationally efficient manner, and also satisfies better candidate monotonicity properties. In view of this, our proposed rule seems to be a compelling solution for achieving proportional representation in voting settings.
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Cites work
- A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
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Cited in
(11)- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- A characterization of proportionally representative committees
- Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation
- Core-stable committees under restricted domains
- New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections
- A note on the method of equal shares
- Optimal algorithms for multiwinner elections and the Chamberlin-Courant rule
- Proportional justified representation
- Proportionally representative clustering
- Proportional clustering, the -plurality problem, and metric distortion
- Candidate monotonicity and proportionality for lotteries and non-resolute rules
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