The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2179446
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01208-3zbMath1437.91176arXiv1708.07580OpenAlexW2968976030MaRDI QIDQ2179446
Publication date: 12 May 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.07580
Related Items (4)
A characterization of proportionally representative committees ⋮ Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation ⋮ Core-stable committees under restricted domains ⋮ Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Handbook on approval voting
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Prudent \(k\)-choice functions: Properties and algorithms
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
- Proportional Representation
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
This page was built for publication: The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
