Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2046010
Recommendations
Cites work
- An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
- Analysing irresolute multiwinner voting rules with approval ballots via SAT solving
- Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
- Finding a collective set of items: from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3548141 (Why is no real title available?)
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- Merging Information Under Constraints: A Logical Framework
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Propositional belief base merging or how to merge beliefs/goals coming from several sources and some links with social choice theory
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
Cited in
(13)- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- Chamberlin-Courant rule with approval ballots: approximating the MaxCover problem with bounded frequencies in FPT time
- Analysing irresolute multiwinner voting rules with approval ballots via SAT solving
- Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
- Justified representation in multiwinner voting: axioms and algorithms
- Representative committees of peers
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting
- Core-stable committees under restricted domains
- Using multiwinner voting to search for movies
This page was built for publication: Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2046010)