Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting
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Cited in
(30)- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- The metric distortion of multiwinner voting
- Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
- Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
- Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location
- Metric-distortion bounds under limited information
- Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
- Aggregation over metric spaces: proposing and voting in elections, budgeting, and legislation
- The distortion of distributed metric social choice
- The distortion of distributed voting
- The distortion of distributed metric social choice
- Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources
- Tight distortion bounds for distributed metric voting on a line
- Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences
- Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond
- Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice
- The distortion of distributed facility location
- Revisiting the distortion of distributed voting
- Robustness of voting mechanisms to external information
- Metric distortion under group-fair objectives
- Distortion of multi-winner elections on the line metric: the polar comparison rule
- On the distortion of multi-winner election using single-candidate ballots
- Submodular participatory budgeting
- Breaking the metric voting distortion barrier
- Improved metric distortion via threshold approvals
- Metric distortion of obnoxious distributed voting
- Beyond the worst case: distortion in impartial culture electorates
- Utilitarian distortion with predictions
- Awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
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