Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0983-yzbMath1392.91062OpenAlexW2340055689MaRDI QIDQ682478

Karine van der Straeten, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 2 February 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01304688/file/wp_201608.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingapproval ballotingmulti-winner election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting ⋮ Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules

Cites Work

• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• Approval voting: three examples
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• The paradox of multiple elections
• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
• Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
• Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
• Approval Voting in Large Electorates
• Proportional Representation
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees

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