Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions

DOI10.1007/BF00179100zbMATH Open0843.90007OpenAlexW1970606456MaRDI QIDQ1906019FDOQ1906019

Authors: Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier, Lainé, Jean 

Publication date: 25 February 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179100

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zbMATH Keywords

tournament solutionssocial choice functionschoice in preference profilescomposition-consistent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (25)

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• New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
• On two new social choice correspondences.
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• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
• Hyper-stable collective rankings
• Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Representation in majority tournaments
• On the functional completeness of simple tournaments
• Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium
• Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
• Deriving weights from general pairwise comparison matrices
• Rank-based choice correspondences
• Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
• A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case

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