On the discriminative power of tournament solutions
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Publication:2806892
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8zbMATH Open1341.91063OpenAlexW2189197005MaRDI QIDQ2806892FDOQ2806892
Authors: Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig 
Publication date: 19 May 2016
Published in: Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8
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Cites Work
Cited In (15)
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
- Unsupervised fuzzy tournament selection
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- Margin of victory for tournament solutions
- Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
- Determining the results of tournament games using complete graphs generation
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