On the discriminative power of tournament solutions
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Publication:2806892
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(16)- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- Extending tournament solutions
- \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
- Unsupervised fuzzy tournament selection
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- Margin of victory for tournament solutions
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
- Determining the results of tournament games using complete graphs generation
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