On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8zbMath1341.91063OpenAlexW2189197005MaRDI QIDQ2806892

Hans Georg Seedig, Felix Brandt

Publication date: 19 May 2016

Published in: Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Uses Software

• PrefLib

Cites Work

• The minimal covering set in large tournaments
• Choosing from a large tournament
• Probability models on rankings
• Optimal strategies for random tournament games

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