On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8zbMATH Open1341.91063OpenAlexW2189197005MaRDI QIDQ2806892FDOQ2806892

Hans Georg Seedig, Felix Brandt

Publication date: 19 May 2016

Published in: Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Probability models on rankings
• Choosing from a large tournament
• The minimal covering set in large tournaments
• Optimal strategies for random tournament games

Cited In (14)

• Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
• \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
• Unsupervised fuzzy tournament selection
• A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
• Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
• Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
• Margin of victory for tournament solutions
• Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
• On the structure of stable tournament solutions
• A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
• Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
• Determining the results of tournament games using complete graphs generation

Uses Software

• PrefLib

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