On the structure of stable tournament solutions

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-1024-xzbMath1400.91163arXiv2004.01651OpenAlexW2562410948MaRDI QIDQ1707316

Markus Brill, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig, Warut Suksompong

Publication date: 29 March 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.01651

zbMATH Keywords

tournament solutionschoice consistencybipartisan settournament equilibrium set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Extending tournament solutions ⋮ Majority-approval social choice ⋮ An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes ⋮ Fixing knockout tournaments with seeds ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions ⋮ \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments

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