Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
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Publication:483107
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0740-4zbMath1302.91075MaRDI QIDQ483107
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein, Felix Fischer
Publication date: 15 December 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/131327/7/131327.pdf
Related Items
Query complexity of tournament solutions, On the structure of stable tournament solutions, Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions, A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz, A note on contestation-based tournament solutions
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