Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9167-xzbMath1233.91014OpenAlexW2130933474MaRDI QIDQ993504

Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:531a6548-12af-4e9c-9694-d333ed4875bd

zbMATH Keywords

dominancecooperative game theorynon-transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items

Extending tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Query complexity of tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal stable sets in tournaments ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement ⋮ A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ Meta-argumentation modelling. I: Methodology and techniques ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

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