Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games

DOI10.1007/S11238-009-9167-XMaRDI QIDQ993504zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein

Publication date 20 September 2010

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:531a6548-12af-4e9c-9694-d333ed4875bd

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative game theorydominancenon-transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Cites work

• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Bargaining and Value
• Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The bargaining problem
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments

Cited in

(10)

• Extending tournament solutions
• The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement
• Meta-argumentation modelling. I: Methodology and techniques
• Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
• Minimal extending sets in tournaments
• Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
• Query complexity of tournament solutions
• Minimal stable sets in tournaments
• The Copeland ratio ranking method for abstract decision problems
• A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set

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