Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
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Publication:993504
DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9167-xzbMath1233.91014OpenAlexW2130933474MaRDI QIDQ993504
Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:531a6548-12af-4e9c-9694-d333ed4875bd
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