The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments

DOI10.2307/1993348zbMath0099.36602OpenAlexW4248538055MaRDI QIDQ3280567

Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1961

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1993348

zbMATH Keywords

applications of probability theory and statistics

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