Acceptable points in games of perfect information
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:772430)
Cited in
(20)- Cooperative concurrent games
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Strategic scheduling games: equilibria and efficiency
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Mean-payoff games with \(\omega\)-regular specifications
- Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
- Computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in win-lose multi-player games
- Coalitional strategic games
- On the computational complexity of decision problems about multi-player Nash equilibria
- On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear bottleneck congestion games
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Dynamical systems associated with the \(\beta\)-core in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Repeated games with complete information
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
- Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
- The strong price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games
This page was built for publication: Acceptable points in games of perfect information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q772430)
