Acceptable points in games of perfect information
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Publication:772430
DOI10.2140/PJM.1960.10.381zbMATH Open0093.33004OpenAlexW2014267214MaRDI QIDQ772430FDOQ772430
Publication date: 1960
Published in: Pacific Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1960.10.381
Cited In (20)
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Dynamical systems associated with the \(\beta\)-core in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Coalitional strategic games
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
- The strong price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games
- On the computational complexity of decision problems about multi-player Nash equilibria
- Strategic Scheduling Games: Equilibria and Efficiency
- Cooperative concurrent games
- Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Mean-payoff games with \(\omega\)-regular specifications
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in win-lose multi-player games
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
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