Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
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Publication:1139508
DOI10.1007/BF01784792zbMath0433.90093OpenAlexW2028326920WikidataQ29545077 ScholiaQ29545077MaRDI QIDQ1139508
Publication date: 1980
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01784792
supergamesstrong equilibriaovertaking criterionevaluation relationsset of payoffsstrong perfect equilibria
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