Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009zbMath1302.91038MaRDI QIDQ485763

Marie Laclau

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

communication; networks; repeated games; folk theorem; imperfect private monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A43: Games involving graphs

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks, Cooperation in partly observable networked markets, Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks

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