Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.009zbMATH Open1302.91038OpenAlexW2112364560MaRDI QIDQ485763FDOQ485763

Authors: Marie Laclau 

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009

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zbMATH Keywords

networkscommunicationrepeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect private monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

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Cited In (15)

• Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks
• Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
• Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Imperfect monitoring in communication networks
• Decomposition of network communication games
• Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
• Communication on networks and strong reliability
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
• Fault reporting in partially known networks and folk theorems
• Cooperation with network monitoring

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