Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
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Cites work
Cited in
(44)- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Game dynamics and evolutionary transitions
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- Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
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