Participation and demand levels for a joint project

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0806-YzbMATH Open1307.91079OpenAlexW3124812986MaRDI QIDQ485433FDOQ485433

Authors: Ryusuke Shinohara 

Publication date: 9 January 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0806-y

Recommendations

• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
• A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
• A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
• Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy

Cited In (6)

• Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods
• Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• On the probability of breakdown in participation games
• Pareto optimal provisions as outcomes of voluntary public good supply
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation

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