A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
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Publication:2452126
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0644-0zbMath1288.91090OpenAlexW2014337600MaRDI QIDQ2452126
Ryusuke Shinohara, Yukihiro Nishimura
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0644-0
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Cites Work
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