A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0644-0zbMATH Open1288.91090OpenAlexW2014337600MaRDI QIDQ2452126FDOQ2452126

Authors: Yukihiro Nishimura, Ryusuke Shinohara 

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0644-0

Recommendations

• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
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• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Non-excludable public good experiments
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
• Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
• Voluntary participation and spite in public good provision experiments: An international comparison

Cited In (6)

• Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Participation and demand levels for a joint project
• A private contributions game for joint replenishment
• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

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