Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0090-yzbMath1202.91093OpenAlexW2167401656MaRDI QIDQ2268910

Paul J. Healy

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0090-y

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmechanism designvoluntary participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem ⋮ Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation ⋮ A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good ⋮ Participation and demand levels for a joint project ⋮ IDENTIFYING THE LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT TRANSFERS AS A SOCIAL OPTIMUM

Cites Work

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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Voluntary implementation

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