Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0090-yzbMath1202.91093MaRDI QIDQ2268910

Paul J. Healy

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0090-y

zbMATH Keywords

public goods; mechanism design; voluntary participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B18: Public goods

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

IDENTIFYING THE LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT TRANSFERS AS A SOCIAL OPTIMUM, Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem

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