Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
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Publication:417681
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.001zbMath1279.91069OpenAlexW3122503113MaRDI QIDQ417681
Yukio Koriyama, Hans Peter Grüner
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.001
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