Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
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Publication:417681
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.001zbMATH Open1279.91069OpenAlexW3122503113MaRDI QIDQ417681FDOQ417681
Authors: Hans Peter Grüner, Yukio Koriyama 
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.001
Recommendations
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Public goods and Arrovian social choice
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- Choice correspondences for public goods
- Democracy and dynamic welfare optima
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
- Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods
- Equilibrium in abstract political economies: With an application to a public good economy with voting
- Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
Cites Work
- Microeconomic theory
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Universal possibility and impossibility results
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Storable votes
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
Cited In (12)
- A group majority voting model of public good provision
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Public good provision with constitutional constraint
- On the limits of democracy
- All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Democracy and dynamic welfare optima
- A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
- Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
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