Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.001MaRDI QIDQ417681zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Peter Grüner, Yukio Koriyama

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

ex post efficiencymajority votingparticipation constraintspublic goods provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Public goods and Arrovian social choice
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• Choice correspondences for public goods
• Democracy and dynamic welfare optima
• On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods
• Equilibrium in abstract political economies: With an application to a public good economy with voting
• Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered

Cites work

• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• Microeconomic theory
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Storable votes
• The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
• Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods
• Universal possibility and impossibility results

Cited in

(12)

• A group majority voting model of public good provision
• Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
• Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
• Democracy and dynamic welfare optima
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
• Public good provision with constitutional constraint
• On the limits of democracy
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions

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