Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents

DOI10.2307/2298018zbMATH Open0703.90021OpenAlexW2051805744WikidataQ29541757 ScholiaQ29541757MaRDI QIDQ3483043FDOQ3483043

Authors: George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298018

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationprobability of an affirmative efficient decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (67)

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• Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
• Information aggregation in large collective purchases
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• Competition of politicians for wages and office
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• Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information
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• The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
• Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
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• Households, markets and public choice
• Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
• Pollution claim settlements under correlated information
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Large strategic dynamic interactions
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• The veil of public ignorance
• Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
• All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Partial exposure in large games
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Provision of a public good with bounded cost
• Efficient compromising
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
• Public goods with congestion
• Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited
• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
• The market for conservation and other hostages
• Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
• Principals and agents: does the assignment of information matter?
• Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
• Large nonanonymous repeated games
• Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
• Identifiable information structures
• An experimental study of the effect of private information in the Coase theorem
• Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies
• Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
• Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
• To sell public or private goods
• The value of a new idea: Knowledge transmission, workers' mobility and market structure
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
• Limits of markets and limits of governments: an introduction to a symposium on political economy
• The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
• Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
• One man, one bid

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