Identifiable information structures

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.12.006zbMATH Open1437.91267OpenAlexW2998123973WikidataQ126444333 ScholiaQ126444333MaRDI QIDQ2178000FDOQ2178000

Authors: Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky 

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.006

Recommendations

• On the recoverability of forecasters' preferences
• Random choice and private information
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• Learning Sets in State Dependent Signalling Game Forms: A Characterization

zbMATH Keywords

information structureforecast aggregationidentifiable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Asymptotic Statistics
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
• Provision of a public good with bounded cost
• The speed of sequential asymptotic learning

Cited In (4)

• A population's feasible posterior beliefs
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Virtually additive learning
• Learning optimal forecast aggregation in partial evidence environments

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