Identifiable information structures

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.12.006MaRDI QIDQ2178000zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky

Publication date 7 May 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

information structureforecast aggregationidentifiable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• On the recoverability of forecasters' preferences
• Random choice and private information
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Cites work

• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Asymptotic Statistics
• How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Provision of a public good with bounded cost
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• The speed of sequential asymptotic learning

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3852930 (Why is no real title available?)
• Virtually additive learning
• Learning optimal forecast aggregation in partial evidence environments
• A population's feasible posterior beliefs

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