A population's feasible posterior beliefs
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Publication:6139983
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105764arXiv2202.01846OpenAlexW4388914233MaRDI QIDQ6139983FDOQ6139983
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs in the population are feasible. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. We apply this result in several domains. First, we study the problem of maximizing the polarization of beliefs in a population. Second, we provide a characterization of the feasible agent-symmetric product distributions of posteriors. Finally, we study an instance of a private Bayesian persuasion problem and provide a clean formula for the sender's optimal value.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01846
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Cited In (3)
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