A population's feasible posterior beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105764OpenAlexW4388914233MaRDI QIDQ6139983FDOQ6139983

Authors Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko 

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01846

zbMATH Keywords

polarizationBayesian persuasionempirical distributions of posteriorsfeasible posterior distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Abstract: We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs in the population are feasible. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. We apply this result in several domains. First, we study the problem of maximizing the polarization of beliefs in a population. Second, we provide a characterization of the feasible agent-symmetric product distributions of posteriors. Finally, we study an instance of a private Bayesian persuasion problem and provide a clean formula for the sender's optimal value.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• A maximal inequality for skew fields
• Agreeing to disagree
• Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
• Bounds on the probability of radically different opinions
• Can coherent predictions be contradictory?
• Coherent combination of experts' opinions. (With discussion)
• Existence of probability measures with given marginals
• Identifiable information structures
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns

Cited in

(3)

• Contradictory predictions with multiple agents
• On the existence of extreme coherent distributions with no atoms
• Coherent distributions on the square-extreme points and asymptotics

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