Agreeing to disagree

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1247127

DOI10.1214/aos/1176343654zbMath0379.62003OpenAlexW2106622011WikidataQ56030630 ScholiaQ56030630MaRDI QIDQ1247127

Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1976

Published in: The Annals of Statistics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343654




Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)

SUPPORT FOR GEOMETRIC POOLINGAsymptotic agreement among communicating decisionmakersTowards Syntactic Epistemic LogicModeling and fusing uncertain multi-sensory data2009 European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Logic Colloquium '09New approach for aggregating multi‐sensory dataCommon, Correlated, and Private Information in Control of Decentralized SystemsCollective decision-making by rational agents with differing preferencesA Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in ContractsAmbiguity Preference and Context Learning in Uncertain SignalingTo be announcedCommon Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social ReasoningMonologues, dialogues, and common priorsSelf-evident events and the value of linkingEconometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefsFeasible joint posterior beliefs with binary signalsIncorporating ignorance within game theory: an imprecise probability approachAn epistemic separation logic with action modelsThe existence of universal qualitative belief spacesCoopetition Against an AmazonA population's feasible posterior beliefsLexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibriumRevealed deliberate preference changeCognitive limits and preferences for informationCoopetition against an AmazonStrategic manipulation in Bayesian dialoguesUnnamed ItemUnnamed ItemUnnamed ItemUnnamed ItemArrow's Theorem of the Deductible with Heterogeneous BeliefsCommon-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network GameUnnamed ItemA STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADE IN A TWO-SIDED ASSET MARKET WITH INFORMATION DIVERSITYBayesian Games: Games with Incomplete InformationFROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORYAN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCEConstructive decision theoryCredibility of information in ``soft games with interperception of emotions.INTRANSITIVITY AND VAGUENESSAGREEMENT THEOREMS FOR SELF-LOCATING BELIEFIntroduction (to the special issue on: Economics and artificial intelligence)Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect informationCommon knowledge and consensus with noisy communicationLevels of knowledge in distributed systems.Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actionsAgreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states of natureCommon Knowledge and the Knowledge Account of AssertionMathematical models for marine insuranceBayesian Evidence Accumulation on Social NetworksBayesian Decision Making in Groups is HardPEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREEDynamic Epistemic LogicsLogic and Probabilistic UpdateLogic and Game TheoryOn Definitive Solutions of Strategic GamesConsensus on simplicial complexes: Results on stability and synchronizationOn the logic of common belief and common knowledgeAwareness and partitional information structuresRepresenting the knowledge of Turing machinesA model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selectionDuopoly signal jammingOn the structure and diversity of rational beliefsKnowledge and best responses in gamesDynamic interactive epistemologyStrategic conversations under imperfect information: epistemic message exchange gamesOn the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard SeltenClassic rational bubbles and representativenessCommon knowledge: Relating anti-founded situation semantics to modal logic neighbourhood semanticsCheap play with no regretOn fuzzy interactive knowledgePreference, rationalizability and equilibriumGame-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledgeDepth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertaintyLattice structure of knowledge and agreeing to disagreePsychology of game playing: introduction to a special issueOn ambiguities in the interpretation of game treesCommon \(p\)-belief: The general caseLearning from others: A welfare analysisBelief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logicThe real effects of sustainable \& responsible investing?Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournamentThe incoherence of agreeing to disagreeKnowledge spaces with arbitrarily high rankTestimony as evidence: more problems for linear poolingReasoning-based introspectionAn infinitary probability logic for type spacesCommon knowledge and limit knowledgeFoundations for optimal inattentionAgreement theorem for neo-additive beliefsUnawareness of theoremsPrivacy in implementationProbabilistic belief logic and its probabilistic Aumann semanticsA computer scientist looks at game theory.A game-theoretic approach to peer disagreementThe fragility of common knowledgeLogic for describing strong belief-disagreement between agents``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach.Do bets reveal beliefs? A unified perspective on state-dependent utility issuesAcademic superstars: competent or lucky?




This page was built for publication: Agreeing to disagree