Agreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states of nature
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Publication:5962156
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0439-zzbMath1232.91051MaRDI QIDQ5962156
Publication date: 21 September 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0439-z
bounded rationality; agreeing to disagree; countable additivity; interactive epistemology; theory of probability
60A10: Probabilistic measure theory
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
62C12: Empirical decision procedures; empirical Bayes procedures
Cites Work
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