Recommendations
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Common priors under incomplete information: a unification
- Uniform priors on convex sets improve risk
- Almost common priors
- Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
- Countable spaces and common priors
- Extensions of the conjugate prior through the Kullback--Leibler separators
- Separation by convex and strongly convex stochastic processes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1301663
Cites work
Cited in
(40)- Weakly rational expectations
- Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences
- Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
- Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
- How common are common priors?
- Agreeable bets with multiple priors
- Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- Overlapping risk adjusted sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria with short-selling
- Belief consistency and trade consistency
- Computing a common prior
- The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
- Bounded arbitrage and nearly rational behavior
- Speculation under unawareness
- On equilibria when agents have multiple priors
- Credit market segmentation, essentiality of commodities, and supermodularity
- The cycles approach
- Countable spaces and common priors
- Monologues, dialogues, and common priors
- Almost common priors
- Weak agreement and the properties of beliefs under ambiguity
- From posteriors to priors via cycles
- Agreeing to disagree revisited
- Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known
- Conditional belief types
- On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
- Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
- Agreeing to agree and Dutch books
- Overlapping sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria for risk measures
- Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
- Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
- Rational expectations can preclude trades
- Monotonic models and cycles
- Payoff continuity in incomplete information games: a comment
- No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
- No trade under verifiable information
- Agreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states of nature
- Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
- Characterizing the common prior assumption.
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