Characterizing the common prior assumption.
DOI10.1006/jeth.2002.2925zbMath1042.91062OpenAlexW2018618672MaRDI QIDQ1867530
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5b11c206f7fba217c6e9b93e4e1c8669bc9d7cc1
agent beliefsCommon Prior Assumption (CPA)CPA characterizationsCPA finite frames disagreements in expectationCPA logical system axiomatizationframe distinguishabilitysound and complete axiom system for CPAtheory of economics
Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Games in extensive form (91A18) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Economics of information (91B44)
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