Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.07.002zbMATH Open1197.91028OpenAlexW2069125786MaRDI QIDQ845016FDOQ845016

Authors: Barton L. Lipman 

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.07.002

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zbMATH Keywords

common priors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption

Cited In (2)

• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
• On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors

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