Characterizing the common prior assumption.

DOI10.1006/JETH.2002.2925MaRDI QIDQ1867530zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph Y. Halpern

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5b11c206f7fba217c6e9b93e4e1c8669bc9d7cc1

zbMATH Keywords

agent beliefsCommon Prior Assumption (CPA)CPA characterizationsCPA finite frames disagreements in expectationCPA logical system axiomatizationframe distinguishabilitysound and complete axiom system for CPAtheory of economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Games in extensive form (91A18) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5542185 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
• A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief
• A logic for reasoning about probabilities
• Agreeing to disagree
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• On Some Completeness Theorems in Modal Logic
• Reasoning about knowledge and probability
• State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(14)

• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• Belief consistency and trade consistency
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Common priors under incomplete information: a unification
• Conservative belief and rationality
• Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
• Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic~logic
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
• Hypergames and Bayesian games: a theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information
• Similarity of differential information with subjective prior beliefs
• People with common priors can agree to disagree
• The wisdom of the crowd and prediction markets
• Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models

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