Hypergames and Bayesian games: a theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/s11424-012-1074-5zbMath1284.91027OpenAlexW2058408763MaRDI QIDQ2439876

Yasuo Sasaki, Kyoichi Kijima

Publication date: 18 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-012-1074-5

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibriumBayesian gameshypergamesbest response equilibriumhyper-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (3)

Hypergame theory: a model for conflict, misperception, and deception ⋮ Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: a generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions ⋮ Subjective rationalizability in hypergames

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• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Complex Strategic Analysis: A Hypergame Study of the Fall of France
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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