Hypergames and Bayesian games: a theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information
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Publication:2439876
DOI10.1007/s11424-012-1074-5zbMath1284.91027MaRDI QIDQ2439876
Publication date: 18 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-012-1074-5
Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Bayesian games; hypergames; best response equilibrium; hyper-Nash equilibrium
Related Items
Hypergame theory: a model for conflict, misperception, and deception, Subjective rationalizability in hypergames, Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: a generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions
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