Iterated expectations and common priors

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0616zbMath0910.90285OpenAlexW2054285221MaRDI QIDQ1268659

Dov Samet

Publication date: 8 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e87d90f0c684aae101f8a773a39dcf6c092cfe22

zbMATH Keywords

necessary and sufficient conditionMarkov matricesexistence of a common prior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items

Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models, Mechanisms for information elicitation, Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models, Monologues, dialogues, and common priors, Value‐based distance between information structures, Self-evident events and the value of linking, Price distortions under coarse reasoning with frequent trade, Belief consistency and trade consistency, Unnamed Item, The cycles approach, Monotonic models and cycles, Conditional belief types, The positive foundation of the common prior assumption, Quantified beliefs and believed quantities, Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors, The veil of public ignorance, From posteriors to priors via cycles, Common priors and separation of convex sets, How common are common priors?, Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors

Cites Work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points