Recommendations
Cites work
- Agreeing to disagree
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Common priors and separation of convex sets
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Iterated expectations and common priors
- On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- We can't disagree forever
Cited in
(11)- Iterated expectations and common priors
- Countable spaces and common priors
- Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
- From posteriors to priors via cycles: an addendum
- Monotonic models and cycles
- The cycles approach
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets (extended abstract)
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
- Cycle conditions for ``Luce rationality
- How common are common priors?
- Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
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