From posteriors to priors via cycles

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.003zbMath1157.91402OpenAlexW3124244410MaRDI QIDQ1007336

José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

posteriorpartitionconsistencycycleknowledgejoinmeettypeincomplete informationprior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models ⋮ Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information ⋮ The cycles approach ⋮ Monotonic models and cycles ⋮ Countable spaces and common priors ⋮ How common are common priors?

Cites Work

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Agreeing to disagree
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model