From posteriors to priors via cycles

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.10.003zbMATH Open1157.91402OpenAlexW3124244410MaRDI QIDQ1007336FDOQ1007336

Authors: José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto 

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.003

Recommendations

• From posteriors to priors via cycles: an addendum
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Monotonic models and cycles

zbMATH Keywords

consistencypartitioncycleincomplete informationjoinknowledgeposteriorpriortypemeet

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• We can't disagree forever
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

Cited In (6)

• How common are common priors?
• The cycles approach
• Countable spaces and common priors
• Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
• Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
• Monotonic models and cycles

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