Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
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Cites work
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Comparison of information structures
- Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- From posteriors to priors via cycles
- Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
- Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
Cited in
(8)- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Interim partially correlated rationalizability
- Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors
- Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Informational robustness of common belief in rationality
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