Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894008
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.010zbMATH Open1330.91019OpenAlexW3125154421MaRDI QIDQ894008FDOQ894008
Authors: Qingmin Liu 
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010
Recommendations
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
- Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information
- Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
- Correlated beliefs: predicting outcomes in \(2\times 2\) games
- Information and the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information
- Pairwise-difference estimation of incomplete information games
Cites Work
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
- Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- From posteriors to priors via cycles
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
- Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
- Comparison of information structures
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
Cited In (8)
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Interim partially correlated rationalizability
- Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors
- Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Informational robustness of common belief in rationality
This page was built for publication: Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894008)
