Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894008
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010zbMath1330.91019MaRDI QIDQ894008
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010
91A10: Noncooperative games
Related Items
Private disclosure with multiple agents, Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution, Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness, Informational robustness of common belief in rationality, Interim partially correlated rationalizability, Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information
Cites Work
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- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
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- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
