Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
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Publication:894008
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.010zbMath1330.91019OpenAlexW3125154421MaRDI QIDQ894008
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010
Related Items (6)
Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Interim partially correlated rationalizability
Cites Work
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- Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
- On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- From posteriors to priors via cycles
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Comparison of information structures
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
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