On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.02.002zbMath1195.91010OpenAlexW2109268064MaRDI QIDQ840689

Qing-Min Liu

Publication date: 14 September 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationBayesian equilibriumseparativityredundant types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (12)

A space of lexicographic preferences ⋮ Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play ⋮ A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs ⋮ Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information ⋮ Invariance to representation of information ⋮ Choice structures in games ⋮ On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution ⋮ The context of the game ⋮ When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? ⋮ Interim partially correlated rationalizability

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