Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Correlated Nash equilibrium
- Static Bayesian games with finite fuzzy types and the existence of equilibrium
- Enhanced cooperation in prisoner's dilemma with aspiration
- Intentions and interactive transformations of decision problems
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Can sunspots replace a mediator?
- Intervening duality and bargaining with a farmer-landowner example.
- On the finiteness of the number of critical equilibria, with an application to random selections
- Similarity of games with incomplete information
- Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
- A reconstruction of Jeffrey's notion of ratifiability in terms of counterfactual beliefs
- Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
- Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
- Sunspot-like effects of random endowments
- Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Backward induction and beliefs about oneself
- Computation as a correlation device
- The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
- On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- Suboptimality of M-step back strategies in Bayesian games
- An axiomatic analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
- Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
- On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
- Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value
- The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- The epistemic structure of a theory of a game
- On the evaluation of solution concepts
- On the logic of common belief and common knowledge
- Representing the knowledge of Turing machines
- A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection
- Nash refinements of equilibria
- Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction
- Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
- Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems
- On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
- Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty
- Several Bayesians: a review. (With discussion)
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- The revelation of information and self-fulfilling beliefs
- Statistical equilibrium in one-step forward looking economic models
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Finitely additive and epsilon Nash equilibria
- One-shot public mediated talk
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- On the existence of a unique correlated equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- A note on one-shot public mediated talk.
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Ambiguous games
- Rationalizable trade
- Nonprofit organizations, free media and donor's trust
- Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types
- Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
- On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Learning to play efficient coarse correlated equilibria
- On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information
- A note on correlated equilibrium
- Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly
- Characterizing the common prior assumption.
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
- Random-player games
- Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
- Endogenous correlated equilibria in noncooperative games
- Coherent decision analysis with inseparable probabilities and utilities
- Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
- Mediated talk
- Equilibrium selection and the restricted game
- The incoherence of agreeing to disagree
- Reasoning-based introspection
- Common knowledge and limit knowledge
- Comparison of information structures
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
- Correlated equilibrium of games in fuzzy environment
- Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge
- A data-driven distributionally robust game using Wasserstein distance
- Modeling players with random ``data access
- Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
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